Payload says Russia’s Kosmos 2612 rendezvoused with ICEYE-X36

Payload reported that Russia’s Kosmos 2612 military satellite approached ICEYE-X36, an ICEYE radar satellite that has shared data with Ukraine since the conflict started in 2022, to within hundreds of meters. The encounter took place in the last month and lasted for most of one day before the Russian satellite pulled away. Payload described the maneuver as a sophisticated characterization mission.

The United States said the approach matches an on-orbit weapons operation, stating that Kosmos 2612 operated dangerously close to X36, according to Thomas DiNanno, the US undersecretary of state. DiNanno used the phrase “dangerously close” to describe the pass. Payload carried that government assessment in its reporting.

ICEYE operates 70 or more near-identical radars, so a countermeasure built against one satellite could work against much of the constellation, Payload states. The company’s size makes a single provider a more efficient target than many, according to the article. Payload identifies ICEYE as the dominant synthetic-aperture radar provider.

Payload argues that defeating a specific radar requires knowing its antenna precisely, because interception alone cannot reliably reveal the parameters a jammer must copy. The article says gathering such antenna data requires running an intelligence operation inside ICEYE or observing the satellite in orbit. Russia appears to have chosen the orbital route, Payload states.

Synthetic-aperture radar imaging transmits pulses at Earth and records faint echoes that rebound from terrain, Payload describes. Because the satellite bathes the imaging area in pulses, a person with a receiver beneath it can catch the signals directly and determine the radar’s frequency and timing, Payload says. That ground-based interception forms the foundation for a crude jammer that must operate inside or near the target area.

Shield Space, a UK firm working on sovereign orbital warfare capabilities, employs Dr Daniel Molland as Chief Technology Officer, Payload identifies. The article presents Molland as the author of the analysis. Shield Space develops capabilities in the UK.

Russia’s standard provocation doctrine prefers inexpensive, high-value cyberattacks such as hacking over open, overt action, Payload says. The proximity operation forced Russia to devote major resources to staffing, satellite endurance, and intelligence analysis, Payload argues. The effort used five satellites, took five months, and required hundreds of m/s of propellant, according to the article.

A single general-purpose jammer cannot practically deny every SAR satellite passing over Ukraine because each radar would require its own detailed characterization, Payload says. The article adds that no one jamming system can match every frequency used by the expanding group of SAR providers.

Payload says SAR echoes are faint enough that a suitable jammer can drown them out. The article asserts Russia has almost certainly built a crude jammer able to exploit this weakness.

A crude jammer must broadcast within the main beam and operate from within or beside the imaged area, where locating and targeting it is easy while ICEYE’s defenses can reject it, Payload states.

Payload defines close-target reconnaissance as moving right up to a target to gather what cannot be seen from farther away. The article characterizes the X36 close approach as a Space CTR operation. Payload says the encounter was likely intended to collect otherwise unobtainable data.

Once ICEYE’s antenna is fully mapped, a jammer can exploit the freshly charted sidelobes, the weak off-axis paths of the radar, Payload says. The Russian jammer would operate from Russian-held territory far outside Ukraine’s imaged area, using less power than a traditional jammer by aiming at weaker sidelobes to defeat the radar’s countermeasures, according to Payload.

Payload says the Space CTR data would probably let Russia deploy a spoofer that injects false images into those sidelobes to mislead Ukraine’s targeting infrastructure.

The encounter handed Russia what it needs to build a jammer or spoofer that degrades or falsifies ICEYE imagery of Ukraine, weakening ISTAR—intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance—for Ukraine and allies, Payload says. Payload projects Russia would probably convert the mission data into a fielded jammer or spoofer capability within the next 12 months.